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RECENT DECISIONS
United States Savings Bonds: Federal Regulations versus State
Law-During the years 1941 through 1945 when plaintiff and his
wife were domiciled in Texas, a community property state, plaintiff
purchased several United States savings bonds with community property
funds. The bonds were issued in co-ownership form, i.e., to plaintiff
"or" his wife. After the wife's death in 1958, a controversy arose be-
tween the plaintiff and the wife's son by a previous marriage concern-
ing ownership of the bonds. The plaintiff claimed exclusive ownership
of the bonds under the Treasury Regulations which recognize the sur-
viving co-owner as the "sole and absolute owner."' The son, who was
principal beneficiary under his mother's will, claimed an interest in the
bonds by virtue of the state's community property laws. 2 In reviewing
the case, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the decision of the
Court of Civil Appeals' and reinstated the holding of the trial court,
which awarded full title to the bonds to the husband but awarded reim-
bursement to the son of half the value of the bonds by virtue of the
state's community property laws.4 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari. 5 Held: Since state law must yield to valid Treasury
Regulations under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion, the husband was unconditionally entitled to the bonds as the sur-
viving co-owner. Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
Prior to Free v. Bland, the majority of courts had given effect to the
Federal Regulations and had recognized the surviving co-owner as the
1 "If either co-owner dies without the bond having been presented and sur-
rendered for payment or authorized reissue, the survivor will be recognized
as the sole and absolute owner. Thereafter, payment or reissue will be made
as though the bond were registered in the name of the survivor alone.
31 C.F.R. §315.61 (1959).
2 Under Texas law, all property acquired by either spouse during marriage
belongs to the community, except property acquired by gift, or descent, or
community property partitioned in a statutory manner. Also, while each
spouse owns an undivided one-half interest in the community property, the
husband is sole manager; therefore, his purchase with community funds is
not, per se, improper on the grounds that he is sole manager, or, possibly,
it could be assumed that the wife assented to the purchase. Tex. Civ. Stat.
art. 4613-4627 (Vernon Supp. 1960).
3Free v. Bland, 337 S.W. 2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960), awarded full title
to the husband without reimbursement relying on Ricks v. Smith, 159 Tex.
280, 318 S.W. 2d 439 (1958), which gave unconditional effect to the Federal
regulations governing savings bonds and recognized the survivor as sole
and absolute owner. However, while the son's writ of error was pending in
the Supreme Court of Texas, that court overruled the Ricks case, supra, in
Hilley v. Hilley, 161 Tex. 569, 342 S.W. 2d 565 (1959), holding that married
couples in Texas would not be permitted to agree to any survivorship pro-
vision with regard to community property. See also note, Community Pro-
perty-Government Savings Bonds Purchased With Community Funds Held
Wife's Separate Property Upon Death of Husband, 37 TEx. L REv. 770 (1959).
4 Bland v. Free, 162 Tex. 72, 344 S.W. 2d 435 (1961).
5 Free v. Bland, 368 U.S. 811 (1961).
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sole and absolute owner of the bonds.6 Some of these courts reasoned
that the bonds represented a contract between the purchaser and the
Federal Government with the Treasury Regulations incorporated into
the contract." Under this theory the co-owner who had not contributed
to the purchase of the bonds was a donee beneficiary, and if the bonds
were not cashed, then he, as survivor, took by virtue of the contract.
Still other courts had arrived at similar results by merely considering
the supremacy of Federal Law under the Constitutions Finally, apply-
ing a property law theory that the bond was owned in joint tenancy,
the survivor had been entitled to the bonds as the surviving joint tenant.
On the other hand, a minority of jurisdictions had held that the
sole purpose of the regulations was to provide a convenient method of
payment for the government in discharging its debt.10 This resulted in
a meaningless payment of the bond to the survivor after which state
law was imposed to take away all or part of the proceeds." This "con-
venience of the government" theory was overruled in Free v. Bland
where the court said that the interest of the government goes beyond
mere convenience of payment. It reasoned that under the Constitution,
the Federal Government has power to borrow money on the credit of
the United States, and in exercising this power the Congress authorized
the Secretary of the Treasury to issue savings bonds in such form and
under such conditions as he may prescribe, subject to the limitations
imposed by Congress. 2 One of the inducements selected by the Treas-
ury to make the bonds attractive to savers and investors was the sur-
vivorship provision, which was a convenient method of avoiding com-
6 E.g., Wachovia Bank and Trust Company, 255 N.C. 114, 120 S.E. 2d 404
(1961); In re Cochran's Estate, 398 Pa. 506, 159 A. 2d 514 (1960); In re
Estate of Chase, 83 Idaho 1, 348 P. 2d 473 (1960). See generally Annot., 37
A.L.R. 2d 1221 (1954).7 E.g., Knight v. Wingate, 205 Ga. 133, 52 S.E. 2d 604 (1949); Chambless v.
Black, 250 Ala. 604, 35 So. 2d 348 (1948); Lemon v. Foulston, 169 Kan. 372,
219 P. 2d 388 (1950) ; Horstman Estate, 398 Pa. 506, 159 A. 2d 514 (1960).
s E.g., Conrad v. Conrad, 66 Cal. App. 2d 280, 152 P. 2d 221 (1944); Lee v.
Anderson, 70 Ariz. 208, 218 P. 732 (1950) ; In re Stanley, 102 Colo. 422, 80
P. 2d 332 (1938) ; United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 50 F. Supp.
73 (M.D. Pa. 1943).9 E.g. Awtry's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 221 F. 2d 749
(8th Cir. 1955); Barrett v. Barrett, 91 F. Supp. 680 (N.D. Ohio 1950);
Stephens v. First Nat. Bank, 65 Nev. 352, 196 P. 2d 756 (1948).
'0 See generally Annot., 37 A.L.R. 2d 1221 (1954).
11In Slater v. Culpepper, 222 La. 962, 64 So. 2d 234 (1953), 37 A.L.R. 2d 1216,
the court said that the Federal Regulations are designated solely to effectuate
a simple method of payment not subject to the inconvenience and delays
attendant upon the settlement of conflicting or disputed claims, and held that
upon the death of the wife, her heirs are entitled to half the value of the
savings bonds purchased with community funds in the name of herself
and her husband as co-owners. See also Succession of Geagan, 212 La. 574,
33 So. 2d 118 (1947); Winsberg v. Winsberg, 220 La. 398, 56 So. 2d 730
(1952); Gladieux v. Parney, 93 Ohio App. 117, 106 N.E. 2d 317 (1951);
Krueger, Problems in Dealing With United States Savings Bonds, 7 KAN.
L. REv. 512 (1959).




plicated probate proceedings. If the state could award full title to the
survivor and then require him to account for half the value of the bonds
to the deceased co-owner's estate, as the Supreme Court of Texas did in
Bland v. Free,13 this award of full title would be a meaningless fiction;
and not only would the attraction of the survivorship feature be re-
duced, but this action by the court would ultimately be a direct inter-
ference with legitimate exercise of the Federal Government's power to
borrow money. Therefore, since the success of the management of the
national debt depends significantly upon the success of the sale of sav-
ings bonds, the attractiveness of the bonds must be preserved by giving
the right-of-survivorship provision supremacy.
The Supreme Court's approach negatives application of a gift
theory14 to sustain the rights of the survivor because now, even though
the one co-owner purchases the bonds with his own money and at all
times retains possession, his dying without surrendering the bonds for
payment entitles the other co-owner to have the bonds as the survivor.
However, application of a contract theory with the regulations forming
part of the contract, or a joint tenancy theory would be consistent with
the survivorship rights provided in the Treasury Regulations. 5
The Supreme Court indicated, however, that the regulations cannot
be used to perpetrate or shield for fraud.16 But this fraud exception
mentioned in Free v'. Bland creates uncertainty as to the types of fact
situations wherein the state courts could safely refuse to follow the
regulations. For example, Estate of Massouras17 involved co-ownership
bonds which were issued to a husband and wife. Pursuant to a divorce
settlement, the parties agreed to and did physically divide the bonds,
and the divorce decree determined and approved the division but did
not purport to vest title to any particular bonds in either party. Upon
the husband's death, an uncashed portion of his half of the bonds, in
their original co-ownership form, were found in his safety deposit box
together with a copy of the divorce judgment. In the probate proceed-
13Note 4 supra.
'1 Conrad v. Conrad, supra note 8. No finding of a completed inter vivos gift is
required to sustain a coowner's right of survivorship.
1sThis is basically what the majority of courts have done; therefore, Free v.
Bland does not have any adverse effect on the majority view in this respect.
16 "While affording purchasers of the bonds an opportunity to choose a survivor-
ship provision which must be recognized by the states, the regulations neither
insulate the purchasers from all claims regarding ownership nor immunize
the bonds from execution in satisfaction of a judgment .... The regulations
are not intended to be a shield for fraud and relief would be available in a
case where the circumstances manifest fraud or a breach of trust tantamount
thereto on the part of a husband while acting in his capacity as manager of
the general community property." Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 670 (1962).
For the majority's position on the fraud issue prior to Free v. Bland, see
generally Annot., 51 A.L.R. 2d 163 (1957); Henderson's Adm'r v. Bewley,
264 S.W. 2d 680 (1957), (Ky. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 962 (1955), 51
A.L.R. 2d 159, 163-200; In re Estate of Hendrickson, 156 Neb. 463, 56 N.W.
2d 711, cert. denied, Kelly v. Rohn, 346 U.S. 854 (1953).
716 Wis. 2d 304, 114 N.W.2d 449 (1962).
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ing, the wife petitioned the court to have the bonds delivered to her on
the grounds that she is the sole and absolute owner by virtue of the
Treasury Regulations, which form a part of the contract between the
Federal Government and the named co-owners. The Supreme Court of
Wisconsin imposed a constructive trust on decedent's divorced wife and
directed her to hold the bonds or proceeds for decedent's estate1 The
court said:
The regulations do not extend to the use of the proceeds of
the bonds but stop with payment. The regulations are to protect
the government from attack in performance of the contract and
to avoid implicating the government in disputes concerning own-
ership thereof.' 9
As can be noted from these words, the "convenience of the government"
theory was used as a vehicle to rationalize the imposition of a construc-
tive trust on the bonds or proceeds. Notwithstanding the fact that this
particular theory was overruled in Free v. Bland, the result is consistent
if the Massouras case can be brought within the fraud exception.
First consider strict application of the Treasury Regulations to the
Massouras case. Under the regulations,2 0 a decree ratifying a property
settlement is not regarded as giving effect to an attempted voluntary
transfer prohibited under sec. 315.20.21 Then it could be reasoned that
under the regulations the husband was given an opportunity to cash the
bonds22 or have them reissued23 and that his failure to act results in
Is Compare Hott v. Warner, 268 Wis. 264, 67 N.W. 2d 370 (1954), where pur-
suant to a divorce settlement the wife was given certain specific property, and
she signed a release as to any further claim that she might have against the
husband in connection with any or all other property that he may own. (In-
cluded in the other property were United States savings bonds issued to the
husband and wife as coowners.) Upon the husband's death, the wife sued his
administrator for the bonds, and the release was held to have extinguished all
right in the husband's property but in no way affected the wife's property.
Therefore, pursuant to the Treasury Regulations the bonds were awarded to
the wife.9 Id. at 311, 114 N.W. 2d at 452.
20 "A decree of divorce ratifying or confirming a property settlement or other-
wise settling the respective interests of the parties in a bond will not be
regarded as a proceeding giving effect to an attempted voluntary transfer
under the provisions of §315.20. Consequently, reissue of savings bonds may
be made to eliminate the name of one spouse for that of the other as owner,
coowner or beneficiary pursuant to such a decree ... " 31 C.F.R. §315.22(a)
(1959).
21 "No judicial determination will be recognized which would give effect to an
attempted voluntary transfer inter vivos of a bond or would defeat or impair
the rights of survivorship conferred by these regulations upon a surviving
coowner or beneficiary, and all other provisions of this subpart are subject
to this restriction. Otherwise, a claim against an owner or coowner of a
savings bond and conflicting claims as to ownership of, or interest in such
bond as between coowners or between the registered owner and beneficiary
will be recognized when established by valid judicial proceedings, upon pre-
sentation and surrender of the bond, but only as specifically provided in this
subpart." 31 C.F.R. §315.20 (a) (1959).
22 "The bond will be paid to either (coowner) upon his separate request, and
upon payment to him the other shall cease to have any interest in the bond.
... " 31 C.F.R. §315.60(a) (1959).23Supra note 20.
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decedent's ex-wife obtaining sole and absolute ownership of the bonds.2 4
If the bonds are given to decedent's estate a conflict with the Treasury
Regulations would arise, and under Free v. Bland the Federal Law will
prevail unless brought within the fraud exception.
The 11Iassouras case presents no issue of fraud (either actual or
constructive), duress, undue influence, or any other oppressive wrong-
ful act but at most a mistake or an inadvertent failure to act,2 5 which
under the regulations would result in penalizing decedent's estate and
giving his ex-wife a windfall of personal property, which in equity
and good conscience she ought not have. Since under the regulations
she had legal title to the bonds which, as she concedes, belonged to de-
cedent pursuant to a divorce settlement, could a constructive trust2 6 be
imposed on the ex-wife (as was done in the M11assouras case) in favor of
decedent's estate based on unjust enrichment? If such a result is still
permissible, it would represent an extension of the Free v. Bland excep-
tion beyond its present wording.
The next question for analysis is the effect of Free v. Bland on the
inter vivos rights of co-owners of United States savings bonds. Some
of the courts in the minority view have simply ignored the regulations27
in allowing an inter vivos transfer of the bonds to a third party contrary
to the rights of a co-owner. 2 Such a result appears to be inconsistent
with Free v. Bland even though the latter only involved survivorship
rights. It would seem that the inter vivos rights under the regulations
should be given supremacy for the same reasons set out in Free v.
Bland, namely that they represent one of the inducements selected by
the Secretary of Treasury to make the bonds attractive to savers and
investors. Therefore, allowing a transfer of the bonds to a third party
in violation of the Treasury Regulations interferes with the govern-
ment's power to borrow money, and under Free v. Bland this is pro-
hibited unless the case can be brought within the fraud exception.
24 Supra note 1.
25 It could have been a mistake of law in that the decedent may have thought
the divorce decree protected him, or it could have been a mistake of fact in
that he thought he would live long enough to use all the bonds; or he may
have inadventently forgotten about them.
26 "A constructive trust . . . is a trust by operation of law which arises con-
trary to intention and in invitum against one who, by fraud, actual or con-
structive, by duress or abuse of confidence, by commission of a wrong, or by
any form of unconscionable conduct, artifice, concealment, or questionable
means, or who in any way against equity and good conscience, either has
obtained or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity
and good conscience, hold and enjoy." 54 Am. Jur., Trusts §218, p. 167.
27 "Savings bonds are not transferable and are payable only to the owners
named thereon ... ." 31 C.F.R. §315.15 (1959).
28 Marshall v. Felkar, 156 Fla. 476, 23 So. 2d 555 (1942) ; In re Neglia's Estate,
403 Pa. 464, 170 A. 2d 357 (1961) ; Note, Inter Vivos Gift of U.S. Savings
Bonds Gives Donee an Equitable Right to Proceeds Despite Federal Regula-
tions on Nontransferability and Survivorship, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 440 (1962).
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To facilitate further analysis of the effect of Free v. Bland on a co-
owner's inter vivos rights, consider the hypothetical situation of a per-
son buying co-ownership bonds with his own funds and retaining posses-
sion of the bond certificates. Now suppose that before maturity the
purchaser cashes the bonds, and the non-paying co-owner brings an
action"9 in a state court claiming that he is entitled to one half the pro-
ceeds of the bonds pursuant to the Treasury Regulations. The regula-
tions have no express provisions concerning the inter vivos property
interest that each co-owner of the bonds possess, so the states can
apply various theories to determine these rights within the limitation
that such theories must not be inconsistent with the regulations.
Applying the third party beneficiary contract theory to the hypo-
thetical fact situation above, the non-paying co-owner is a donee bene-
ficiary under a contract between the purchaser and the Federal Gov-
ernment with the Treasury Regulations incorporated into the contract ;30
therefore, he acquires a vested contract right to cash the bonds subject
to defeasance upon the other co-owner's cashing of them before he
does.31 But implicit in the right to cash the bonds is possession of them,
and since the purchaser has at all times retained possession, this further
limits the co-owner's interest to a defeasible contract right to cash the
bonds if the purchaser gives him possession. In other words, the pur-
chaser would necesarily have to make a gift of the bonds to the non-
paying co-owner by delivering them all3 2 or by placing them in a joint
safety deposit box accessible to both persons.3 3 Therefore, in the hypo-
thetical problem the court could not sustain the donee's claim of one half
interest in the bonds without violating the Treasury Regulations which
have the force and effect of Federal Law under Free v. Bland.
The counter-argument to the contract theory is that co-ownership
bonds do not confer in the non-paying co-owner a mere contract right
but rather a vested property right 34 with the mere application of the
contract theory, in itself, contravening the Treasury Regulations. Then
the inter vivos rights of the co-owners must be examined under gift law
or joint tenancy law which confer the necessary property rights. Under
29 Supra note 21.
30 Note that the third party beneficiary contract has been successfully applied
(supra note 7) to the survivorship rights of a coowner.3 1 Supra note 22; Cohen v. Cohen, 141 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1958).32Littlejohn v. County Judge, Pembing County, 79 N.D. 550, 58 N.W.2d 278
(1953).
33 Stephens v. First Nat. Bank, supra note 9. Compare American Trust Company
v. Fitzmaurice, 131 Cal. App. 2d 382, 280 P. 2d 545 (1955).
34 It could be argued that since the regulations recognize conflicting claims be-
tween coowners as to ownership or interest in the bond, then by implication
the regulations recognize a present interest or ownership in each coowner.
§315.20(a), supra note 21. But this may conflict with §315.60(a), supra note 22,
which says when the bonds are cashed the other coowner's interest ceases,
unless §315.60 merely protects the government from a myriad of law suits
and puts the burden of adjudication on the state courts in light of §315.20 (a).
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the gift theory, the argument could be that the purchaser used his own
funds and retained complete dominion and control over the bond cer-
tificates; therefore, the gift fails for want of delivery or lack of dona-
tive intent.3 5 So under the hypothetical problem, the non-paying co-owner
did not have a vested property right and could make no claim to the
proceeds of the bonds after they were cashed. The gift theory presents
a number of problems which may thwart its application to the inter
vivos rights of a co-owner. First, the gift theory was not applicable to
the right of survivorship interest of a co-owner; hence, this would pre-
sent a rather anomalous situation of having to apply gift law in one
instance and not in another to determine rights stemming from the same
instrument. Second, if the purchaser had desired to keep the inter vivos
property right in himself, he could have purchased beneficiary type
bonds3 6 which specifically accomplish this result .3  Third, there is a
possibility that a situation could arise under the gift theory in which
its application could contravene the Treasury Regulations.38 Fourth, if
the Treasury Regulations, per se, confer a property right3 9 in each co-
owner, then application of the gift theory violates the regulations, since
this result is not achieved in all cases. For these reasons the gift theory
is deemed not feasible.
Pursuing the joint tenancy theory, it can be said that a person who
buys bonds with his own funds and registers them in his name and that
of another's 40 creates a joint tenancy in each bond with its inherent
right of survivorship. Therefore, if the purchaser cashed the bonds, he
would sever the joint tenancy and create a tenancy in common, giving
the non-paying co-owner a right to half the proceeds. 41 The problem
35 In re Meyer's Estate, 359 Pa. 577, 60 A. 2d 50 (1948). In re Guardianship of
Sachs, 173 Ohio St. 270, 181 N.E. 2d 464 (1962).
36 The Treasury Regulations provide for three types of bonds: (1) single owner-
ship bonds (2) coownership bonds (3) beneficiary (P.O.D.) bonds. 31 C.F.R.
§315.7(a) (1959).
3 Contrary to this, the purchaser may have intended to make a gift of the bonds
to the non-paying coowner at a future time; coownership bonds would facili-
tate such intention without the necessity of reissue or other troublesome pro-
cedures.
38 Suppose under the hypothetical problem that the purchaser delivered the bonds
to the other coowner to hold for safekeeping, and there was no express or
implied agreement between the coowners not to cash the bonds. The non-paying
coowner cashes the bonds and the original purchaser brings an action to re-
cover the proceeds claiming that there was no completed gift. If the court
were to uphold the contention of the purchaser and award him the proceeds,
it would contravene the regulations which gives either coowner the right to
cash the bond and extinguishes the right of the other coowner. The coowner
committed no fraud or wrongful act so as to invoke the Free v. Bland excep-
tion. See Thibeault v. Thibeault, 147 Me. 213, 85 A. 2d 177 (1952).
3 See note 34 supra.
4oUnder the regulations the bonds are actually registered in the "or" form.
See 31 C.F.R. §315.60 (1959).
41 In Thibeault v. Thibeault note 38 supra, the husband had purchased coowner-
ship bonds, using his own funds, with his wife as coowner. The wife redeemed
the bonds, and the husband sued to recover such part of the proceeds as in
equity and good conscience belonged to him. The court found that the husband
[Vol. 46
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that arises in applying this theory is satisfying the four unities4 2 neces-
sary to the creation of a joint tenancy. If the purchaser retains posses-
sion of the bonds, 43 does this satisfy the unity of possession require-
ment ? This problem can be surmounted by drawing an analogy to joint
bank accounts. For example, in Barbour v. First Citizens Bank of
Watertown4 5 the court said that the controlling consideration is the
intention of the original depositor; it is not essential to the creation of
a joint bank account with the right of survivorship that the beneficiary
depositor have knowledge of the account, that he have possession of
the passbook, that he sign the signature card or make withdrawals
therefrom. However, these are important factors and competent evidence
bearing on the question of intention. For the purposes of co-ownership
bonds, it could be said that the purchaser was cognizant of the Treasury
Regulations when he bought the bonds, and his choice of co-ownership
bonds over beneficiary type bonds is evidence of an intention to create
a joint tenancy. Therefore, the purchaser, having retained possession
of the bonds, held them not exclusively for his own benefit but as
"trustee" for himself and the other co-owner, and when the purchaser
cashed the bonds, as in the hypothetical example, the other co-owner
had a right to half the proceeds.
In Will of Barnes,46 co-ownership bonds were cashed by the guardian
during the ward's lifetime, and the proceeds were deposited in the
guardianship account. Upon the ward's death, the surviving co-owner
wanted to recover the proceeds of the bonds pursuant to the Treasury
Regulations which recognized him as the sole and absolute owner. How-
ever, the ward's sole heir contended that the joint tenancy was de-
stroyed during the decedent's lifetime when his guardian liquidated the
bonds; hence, the proceeds were an asset of the estate and not subject
to the rights of survivorship. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held
and the wife each had a half interest in the bonds and ordered the wife to
pay to the husband one half of the proceeds. See also Byer v. Byer, 180 Kan.
258, 303 P. 2d 137 (1957) ; Baskett v. Crook, 86 Cal. App. 2d 355, 195 P. 2d
39 (1948); Barrett v. Barrett, 91 F. Supp. 680 (N.D. Ohio 1950); In re
Meyer's Estate supra note 35; Contra: American Trust Company v. Fitz-
maurice, 131 Cal. App. 2d 382, 280 P. 2d 545 (1955), which held that placing
of a second name on a government bond does not establish the intention of
the former sole owner to restrict his or her power to dispose of the bond
during lifetime or to give such person, whose name is placed second, a present
equal interest.
42 Namely, the unities of time, title, interest, and possession.
43 This problem is not present where the bonds are kept in a joint safety deposit
box accessible to both coowners.
44 Neither joint tenant is entitled to exclusive possession; but rather, both have
the right to possession. Therefore, the Treasury Regulations, by allowing
either coowner to cash the bonds, impliedly recognize the fact that each co-
owner has a right to possession.
4 77 S.D. 106, 86 N.W. 2d 526 (1957).
464 Wis. 2d 22, 89 N.W. 2d 807 (1958). See also In re Johnson's Estate 351
Ill. App. 111, 113 N.E. 2d 590 (1953); Morris v. Morris, 195 Tenn. 133, 258
S.W. 2d 732 (1953); In re Church's Estate, 141 F. Supp. 703 (D.C. 1956);
In re Barletta's Estate, 2 Misc. 2d 135, 150 NYS 2d 479 (1956).
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that the unauthorized cashing of the bonds by the guardian did not
terminate the joint tenancy because the power to cash the bonds was a
right personal to the co-owners and not to be exercised by the guardian
except in cases of necessity or court order. The court found that a court
order had never been granted and that the receipts from the ward's
other assets were sufficient for his maintenance and support. In the
process of arriving at its decision, the court used the following language:
After the bonds are paid the United States has no interest in
the proceeds and state law controls the rights to those.4 1
Since this theory was discarded in Free v. Bland, the case must be
examined in light of that decision's exception.
Under the regulations, the proceeds of savings bonds will be paid
to either co-owner upon the request of such co-owner 8 or his guardian,. 9
and the other person then ceases to have any interest in the bonds.
Under these circumstances, the result in Barnes would be in direct con-
travention to the regulations and would be fatal to the outcome of the
case in view of the Supremacy Clause. But, as previously noted, the
regulations do not insulate the purchasers from all claims regarding
ownership, nor do they shield fraud. To bring the case within the excep-
tion, it can be argued that the guardian's cashing of the bonds without
necessity or court order was a wrongful act that worked constructive
fraud on the survivor, and in equity and good conscience such an act
ought not be allowed to defeat the other co-owner's right of survivor-
ship. This case is illustrative of a wrongful act occurring during the
lives of theco-owners, and upon the death of one co-owner the survivor-
ship right of the other co-owner could be enforced by applying the Free
v. Bland exception.
Regardless of whether or not the regulations confer a property in-
terest in the non-paying co-owner, the Free v. Bland exception should
still be applicable to inter vivos rights. Therefore, if the bonds are pur-
chased with stolen funds, or with the joint funds of another person
who is not named a co-owner, or if any other wrongful act is involved,
a constructive trust should be imposed in favor of the person who was
wronged by such acts.
In summation, the rule now appears to be that the survivor of co-
ownership savings bonds will be recognized as the sole and absolute
owner except in cases that fall within the Free v. Bland exception, and
4 Id. at 25, 89 N.W. 2d at 809.
48 Supra note 22.
49 ...... Unless the form of registration gives the name of the representative
requesting payment, a certificate or certified copy of the letters of appointment
from the court making the appointment, under the seal of the court, or other
proof of qualification if not appointed by a court should be submitted. . ..
However, if such representative presents for payment a bond registered in
the name of his ward accompanied by proof of his qualification, payment will
be made to such representative." 31 C.F.R. §315.50 (1959).
[Vol. 46
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that application of the third party beneficiary contract theory or joint
tenancy theory is allowable under the Treasury Regulations to deter-
mine such rights; the gift theory being inapplicable. As to the inter
vivos rights of the co-owners of savings bonds, if the regulations are
construed as not conferring a property right on the co-owners but merely
a contract right, the third party beneficiary contract theory is applicable.
If they are construed as conferring property rights, then the joint ten-
ancy theory is applicable in sustaining these rights, and application of
either the gift theory or contract theory would appear to be contrary
to the Treasury Regulations.
EDWIN R. RoSSINI
Domestic Relations: Full Faith and Credit Permits Collateral
Attack of Foreign Divorce-A wife sought a divorce a mensa et
thoro in Maryland and her husband filed a motion to dismiss offering
an Alabama decree of divorce as a defense. In acknowledging the de-
fense as valid the trial court stated, ". . .the Plaintiff is estopped to now
question the jurisdiction and cannot collaterally attack the jurisdiction
issue because she appeared through local counsel in Alabama and filed
her answer and waiver .... -1 The court of appeals 2 reversed for the
following reasons: (1) neither the attorney before whom she executed
the waiver of notice and answer nor the attorney who appeared for
her in Alabama was chosen by her; (2) the waiver of notice and answer
was executed before the proceedings were filed in Alabama; and (3)
the wife did not appear in person before the court or actively partici-
pate in the proceedings.
The facts showed that the husband was absent from Maryland for
only two days and had no intention of becoming a domiciliary of Ala-
bama. Therefore, the Alabama divorce was not entitled to full faith
and credit because the court lacked jurisdiction:
A decree of divorce is a conclusive adjudication of everything
except the jurisdictional facts upon which it is founded, and
domicile is a jurisdictional fact. The State of domiciliary origin
is not bound by an unfounded recital in the record of a court of
another State .... I
A brief summary of the interpretation of the full faith and credit
clause 4 by the United States Supreme Court relative to divorce is essen-
' Brief of Appellant, Record Extract p. E4-E5, Pelle v. Pelle, 229 Md. 160, 182
A.2d 37 (1962).
2 Pelle v. Pelle, supra note 1.
3 Pelle v. Pelle, supra note 1 ,182 A.2d at 40, quoting Slansky v. State, 192 Md.
94, 108, 63 A.2d 599, 605 (1949).
4 U.S. Const. art IV, §1:
Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records,
and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may by
general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and proceed-
ings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.
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